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ABSTRACT   This article outlines the different trajectories of the indigenous rights movement 
in Africa, and discusses the factors that have contributed to its success or decline. Two case 
studies are compared; namely, the case of the San people of Botswana in Southern Africa, and 
the case of the Mbororo people of Cameroon in West Africa. On a general level, this article 
argues that the indigenous rights movement in different parts of Africa has gone through various 
phases, from expectation and success to disillusionment and pragmatism. Moreover, it demon-
strates that the San and Mbororo communities and other groups not only rely on the global 
indigenous rights movement, but have also adopted alternative and complementary strategies to 
deal with the unforeseen consequences of this movement. Finally, we argue that our case studies 
attest to the enduring relevance of the nation-state and the ideal of ethnic coexistence in Africa. 
Key Words: Indigeneity; Coping strategies; United Nations; Government policy; Central 
Kalahari; Northwest Cameroon.
INTRODUCTION
‘Indigeneity’ has been a highly controversial concept, particularly in the African 
context. Within the past 20 years, many ethnic and minority groups in Africa have 
claimed ‘indigeneity’ based on their political marginalization in their country or 
region of residence and their cultural difference from the majority population. They 
have drawn inspiration from the definition of ‘indigenous peoples’ adopted by the 
United Nations (UN) as a legal category with collective entitlements, and have 
connected with the global indigenous rights movement. Concurrently, there has 
been extensive debate within the field of Africanist anthropology regarding the 
analytic usefulness of the ‘indigeneity’ concept. Moreover, several African govern-
ments have questioned the applicability of this notion to the African continent, 
arguing that all population groups may be considered ‘indigenous’. However, with 
the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, the 
criticism of this concept has abated, and many African governments have attempted 
to incorporate a discourse on indigenous rights in their policies and development 
programs; however, the outcomes of such efforts have varied.
This article outlines different trajectories of the indigenous rights movement in 
Africa, and discusses potential contributors to its success or decline. In particular, 
we compare two case studies: the San of Botswana, a hunter-gatherer group whose 
involvement in the indigenous rights movement dates to the late 1980s, and whose 
socioeconomic strategies in the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) have been 
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documented by Junko Maruyama (2003; 2009; 2010; 2012) and the Mbororo of 
Cameroon, a pastoralist group that gained international recognition as an indige-
nous people in 2005, and whose political trajectory, especially in northwest 
Cameroon, has been closely followed by Michaela Pelican (2008; 2009; 2010; 
2011; 2013; in press).
ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL CONTROVERSIES REGARDING INDIGE-
NEITY
In his comprehensive study of the history of the global indigenous rights move-
ment, Ronald Niezen (2003; 2010) clarified the constructed nature of ‘indigene-
ity’, which he refered to as ‘indigenism’, to highlight its character of a political 
movement. He argued that, “Indigenous Peoples were first the citizens of an idea 
before they became members of an international community with distinct rights” 
(Niezen, 2010: 135). Thus, the term indigenous peoples was initially introduced 
as a legal category, and only later was bestowed meaning. Understood primarily 
as a political notion, this term may refer to different subjects in different contexts. 
The application of the discourse on indigenous rights to the African continent 
has generated considerable debate among both academics and policy makers (cf. 
Hodgson, 2009; Pelican, 2009). Although indigenous activism has had a long his-
tory, and the status of ‘first peoples’ is generally uncontested in the Americas and 
the Pacific, the situation in Africa is different; it is much more problematic and 
controversial to define which groups count as indigenous given the long and ongo-
ing histories of migration, assimilation, and conquest. Furthermore, as Kopytoff 
(1987) demonstrated in his classic essay, African societies tend to reproduce them-
selves at their internal frontiers, thus continuously creating and recreating a dichot-
omy between ‘original inhabitants’ and ‘late-comers’ regarding which political pre-
rogatives are negotiated. This recurrent process does not allow for the permanent 
and clear-cut distinction between ‘first nations’ and ‘dominant societies’ that is 
implied by the universal notion of indigenous peoples. Accordingly, some anthro-
pologists have criticized the concept of indigenous peoples as inapplicable to the 
African context, and as promoting an essentialist ideology of culture and identity 
(e.g., Kuper, 2003; 2005). Conversely, others have claimed that these complexities 
have effectively been reflected in the working definitions of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) and the UN, which emphasize cultural distinctiveness, politi-
cal marginalization, and self-identification as fundamental criteria. In their view, 
the above criticism is not only unjustified, but is counterproductive to both the 
anthropological endeavor and ‘indigenous realities’ (e.g., Kenrick & Lewis; 2004: 
8). A reconciliatory approach was suggested by Barnard (2004; 2006), who ques-
tioned the validity of ‘indigenous peoples’ as an anthropological concept, while 
recognizing its utility as a political and legal tool in the struggle for collective 
rights.
Concurrent with the academic debate, many African governments have opposed 
the concept of indigenous peoples and their entitlement to land, arguing that all 
Africans are indigenous and should have equal access to natural resources (Lutz, 
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2007). In this context, it is important to consider that, unlike the case in the 
Americas or the Pacific, the indigenous rights movement in Africa has not devel-
oped as a critique of European colonialism and imperialism; instead, it developed 
in response to the policies adopted by independent, post-colonial African states. 
Thus, according to these states, the indigenous rights movement, with its claim 
that certain ethnic groups deserve preferential treatment, goes against the grain of 
nation-building, a process that is still relevant to many African governments. 
Although UN deliberations regarding this issue began in 1971, it was only in 
2007 that the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted. A 
critical moment occurred in 2006, when a group of African states (in particular 
Namibia, Botswana, and Nigeria) objected to several provisions of the declaration 
(Oldham & Frank, 2008; Pelican, 2009). Subsequently, African UN member states 
agreed to maintain a united position, and issued a ‘draft aide memoire’ specify-
ing their concerns regarding the definition of ‘indigenous peoples’, and issues 
regarding self-determination, ownership of land and resources, establishment of 
distinct political and economic institutions, and national and territorial integrity. 
Moreover, they stated that the declaration might pose fundamental constitutional 
and political problems for some member states, rendering its implementation impos-
sible. Faced with these objections, the African Union and the Global Indigenous 
Peoples’ Caucus engaged in serious negotiations. Eventually, the African Group 
agreed on nine amendments to the declaration, two of which addressed the issue 
of definition and the possible misinterpretation of the right to self-determination. 
Finally, in September 2007, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
was adopted by the General Assembly with the support of the African Group and 
negative votes by Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.
As correctly noted by Oldham and Frank (2008), the objections of the African 
Group are at the center of the anthropological controversy regarding the concept 
of indigenous peoples. As argued by Suzman (2002), the adoption of the 
Declaration on Indigenous Peoples’ Rights has been particularly problematic for 
southern African states, such as Botswana and Namibia, which excluded the pro-
vision for any differential treatment of their citizens based on race or ethnicity to 
distance themselves from apartheid politics. In this context, indigenous rights are 
sometimes understood as a form of segregation that designates certain territories 
for certain ethnic groups. Conversely, in countries such as Cameroon, where eth-
nic and regional favoritism have long been vital features of national politics 
(Bayart, 1984; Kofele-Kale, 1986; Mehler, 1993), the concept of indigenous peo-
ples is much less problematic. However, as shown below, the Declaration’s imple-
mentation has not been without problems in both southern and western Africa. 
Moreover, in recent years, the discourse on international development has taken a 
different turn, promoting governmental and non-governmental initiatives, and thus 
shaping efforts to build civil societies. This was illustrated by Hodgson in her 
book “Being Maasai, Becoming Indigenous” (2011) with regard to Maasai 
pastoralists in Tanzania, and their self-positioning in relation to discourses about 
indigenous rights and pastoral livelihoods. 
The Maasai and Hadza of Tanzania were one of the first African groups to join 
the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations in 1989 (Hodgson, 
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2011: 25). In response to the economic and political changes in the early 1990s, 
a few ethnic-based Maasai non-governmental organizations (NGOs) emerged. They 
adopted the discourse on indigenous rights to secure cultural and political rights, 
as well as access to land. This was followed by the establishment of an umbrella 
organization in the mid-1990s to represent the interests of all indigenous peoples 
in Tanzania, including pastoralist and hunter-gatherer groups. Finally, in the 2000s, 
Maasai activists changed their lobbying strategies, gradually refraining from the 
discourse about indigenous rights, and rephrasing their claims in terms of pastoral 
livelihoods in response to the development framework currently favored by the 
Tanzanian government. 
Hodgson’s study clearly shows that local African responses to the global indig-
enous rights movement have significantly shifted during the past three decades in 
response to the variable national and international situations. Moreover, it suggests 
the importance of taking a case-sensitive approach to and examining the different 
experiences of African peoples in different national and historical contexts when 
studying the indigenous rights movement in Africa. The Maasai case will be dis-
cussed and related to the findings of our case studies in the conclusion of this 
article to offer insights that are more generally applicable to the indigenous rights 
movement in Africa. 
In subsequent sections, we clarify the trajectories of the indigenous rights move-
ment in Botswana and Cameroon, and develop a comparative perspective that is 
generally applicable to the African context. In particular, we analyze the engage-
ment of San hunter-gatherers in the CKGR, where Junko Maruyama has conducted 
fieldwork since 2000, and the political lobbying of Mbororo pastoralists, with 
whom Michaela Pelican has been working since the 1990s in the Cameroon Grass-
fields. 
The San and Mbororo communities were referred to by the African Commis-
sion on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR, 2006) as typical examples of 
African indigenous peoples, and both have participated in UN-based indigenous 
peoples’ activities. Moreover, rather than comparing the political strategies of pas-
toralist groups in different parts of Africa (e.g., the Mbororo in Cameroon, the 
Maasai in Tanzania) or of different hunter-gatherer groups (e.g., the San in Botswana, 
the Hadza in Tanzania), we thought it would be more enlightening, albeit chal-
lenging, to compare the case studies of two economically and culturally different 
groups that have been placed in the same category by the indigenous rights frame-
work of the UN. As our analysis will show, the indigenous rights movement in 
Africa is not homogenous, but rather, is characterized by great diversity. This 
diversity is reflected in, among other things, the different purposes and extents of 
San and Mbororo involvement in indigenous rights activism, as well as the diver-
gent policy approaches of the two nation-states. Furthermore, whereas both cases 
attest to the controversial nature of the concept of indigenous peoples in Africa, 
they also reflect the considerable variety of local reactions and coping strategies 
that have emerged in response to the effects of international advocacy. 
It should be noted that our original fieldwork was conducted independently, and 
with different research interests and different methods. That is, only retrospectively 
was a comparative framework applied to the original data. As a result, the pre-
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sentations of the two cases will slightly differ in terms of focus and research 
methodology. Although we are aware that our divergent approaches may under-
score differences rather than commonalities, our comparative analysis is based on 
long-term familiarity with the two settings, and a shared perspective on the indig-
enous rights movement in Africa. To structure the comparison, our explorations 
will be guided by the following questions: What does indigenous identity mean 
for different groups in Africa? How and for what purposes has the concept been 
employed? Which historical trajectories can be identified, and how effective has 
the indigenous rights movement been in different parts of the continent? What are 
alternative, complementary strategies? Both case studies will address the follow-
ing themes: the historical background of the people and their social position in 
their states, their ways of connecting with the global indigenous rights movement, 
the complexities of discourses on indigeneity in their respective countries, local 
reactions to the global indigenous rights movement, and alternative and comple-
mentary strategies.
CASE 1: THE SAN OF BOTSWANA: INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY AND 
DAILY COPING STRATEGIES
The San, or the ‘Bushmen’, who are known as nomadic hunter-gatherers living 
in southern Africa, have been displaced and impoverished for many years as a 
result of the intrusion of Bantu-speaking agro-pastoralists, European colonialism, 
large-scale infrastructure projects, and land concessions to companies. Indeed, they 
have become the most marginalized ethnic group in southern Africa, and only 
account for a small percentage of the populations of Botswana, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Angola. With a total current population of approximately 100,000 
(Cassidy et al., 2001), the San are subdivided into three large language groups, 
each consisting of many small language groups, such as |Gui, ||Gana, !Xun, Khwe, 
and Hai||kom (Barnard, 1992). Half of these groups live in Botswana, with a small 
number of |Gui- and ||Gana-speaking San living in the Central Kalahari region. 
Their case is rather particular (Saugestad, 2011), and will be the focus of this 
article.
Since the colonial era, different actors with different agendas have attempted to 
improve the social situation of the San. In Botswana, the first official measure to 
benefit the San was instituted by the British protectorate government. Under the 
British colonial policy of indirect rule, the Tswana people, a majority ethnic group 
in this area, received privileged treatment, and their chieftainships were formally 
institutionalized. Concurrently, the presence of ethnic minority groups, such as the 
Kalanga, the Yeyi, the Subiya, and the San, who in the past were integrated into 
Tswana chiefdoms as people of secondary or servitude status, were almost ignored 
by colonial officials. However, the |Gui, and ||Gana San in the Central Kalahari 
area were given special treatment, because they were viewed as a unique hunter-
gatherer community with minimal contact with the outside world. In 1961, per 
the recommendation of the Bushman Research Officer, the colonial government 
decided to establish the Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR), situated at the 
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center of the country and covering 52,000 km2. The main purpose of the reserve 
was to provide protection for the wildlife and the traditional hunting-gathering 
lifestyle of the local San people (Silberbauer, 1965). 
After Botswana gained independence in 1966, the new government started the 
Bushman Development Programme in 1974 in recognition that the San were the 
most marginalized group in the country and needed special assistance. In 1978, 
this program was renamed the Remote Area Development Programme (RADP), 
and no longer only targeted the San, but also included all people living outside 
organized village settlements in their mandate. The new definition of the program’s 
target group emphasized geographic remoteness and socioeconomic marginaliza-
tion rather than ethnicity (Government of Botswana, n.d.).The RADP encouraged 
the remote area dwellers, known as RADs, the majority of whom were San, to 
relocate to government-planned settlements with a water supply, schools, clinics, 
and income-generating projects. As a result of this expensive project, more than 
70% of the San in Botswana were living in the 64 RADs settlements by 2003 
(Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis, 2003). The government pro-
gram for the San living in the CKGR was one among many. The RADP started 
at the CKGR in 1979, and the |Gui and ||Gana San began to adopt a sedentary 
lifestyle at a government-planned settlement called Xade. The RADP encouraged 
the residents to raise goats, farm, work for wages, and sell handicrafts; at the 
same time, they managed to continue hunting and gathering (Tanaka, 1987). Fur-
thermore, in 1986, the government decided that the residents of the CKGR should 
be relocated outside the reserve to provide them with access to better services, 
and to ensure the protection of the fauna and flora within the reserve. 
The Indigenous Rights Movement in Central Kalahari
In addition to government initiatives, newly emerged NGOs were involved in 
the indigenous rights movement in Botswana. The political campaign accompany-
ing the CKGR relocation has been well documented (e.g., Sapignoli, 2009; 
Maruyama, 2010; Saugestad, 2011; Hitchcock et al., 2011); given the comparative 
purposes of this article, only an outline of these events will be presented. 
The relocation program was announced in the 1980s, which was also the period 
in which several ethnic minority groups in Botswana started to organize them-
selves to protest government pressure to assimilate. According to Solway (2011: 
220), Botswana experienced exponential economic growth in the 1980s, and many 
minority individuals found valuable positions in the expanding urban bourgeoisie. 
Unlike other minority groups, such as the Kalanga and the Yeyi, the |Gui and 
||Gana San lacked grassroots organizations and political activists, as well as an 
educated and urban-based elite at this time. This created a vacuum that was soon 
filled by individuals from outside the San community, including members of 
national and international NGOs who pursued varying agendas. 
The announcement of the CKGR relocation program coincided with the point 
in time in which international organizations and NGOs began to pay attention to 
the issue of indigenous peoples in Africa. Immediately after the relocation was 
officially announced, international NGOs outside Africa initiated protest move-
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ments, and started to apply the term ‘indigenous people’ to the San. In addition, 
they provided financial and technical support to establish regionally based NGOs. 
In 1993, the local San NGO, the First People of the Kalahari (FPK), was estab-
lished with the goal of stopping the relocation program. The FPK was supported 
by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), a Denmark-
based international NGO and a major player in the global indigenous rights move-
ment. The FPK subsequently allied with Survival International, a popular, London-
based international advocacy organization. They worked together to attract inter-
national attention to the CKGR issue, and to claim indigenous identity and rights 
for the San in Botswana. On the local level, the FPK established connections with 
a local pioneer NGO, the Kuru Family of Organizations, which works for the 
sociocultural development of marginalized minorities, especially the San. Further-
more, a regional NGO, the Working Group for Indigenous Minorities in Southern 
Africa (WIMSA), was established in 1994 to represent the interests of all San in 
Namibia, Botswana, Angola, and South Africa. It committed itself to the protest 
against the CKGR relocation and cooperated with the FPK. 
Despite the attempts of many local, regional, and international NGOs, the relo-
cation program actually began in 1997. In 2002, the government stopped provid-
ing services, such as water and medical care, to the CKGR and prevented its for-
mer residents from returning to their homeland. Between 1997 and 2002, approx-
imately 3,000 people were relocated to the Kx’oensakene, Kaudwane, and Xere 
resettlement sites.
 After this relocation exercise, the various NGOs supporting the San rallied to 
form a negotiation team to press their claims with the Botswanan government. 
Finally, they decided to take their case to the Botswana High Court on behalf of 
the 186 displaced San individuals, which raised public attention. Both sides tried 
to generate public support using the Internet and mass media, which created an 
even more heated debate over the CKGR issue. 
After a long process, the High Court of Botswana ruled on December 13, 2006 
that the government had illegally evicted the San from their ancestral lands in 
what is now the CKGR. The ruling quoted the Australian Mabo decision of 1992, 
which recognized the entitlement of Australia’s aboriginal peoples to their ances-
tral lands and to compensation for their losses, as well as other international law 
cases related to indigenous peoples (Judgment of the High Court of Botswana 
2006). The 2006 court ruling was expected to create a precedent for the legal 
strategies of indigenous peoples in other African countries, where most of the 
governments have been reluctant to recognize the concept of indigenous peoples.
Indigeneity in Botswana
In Botswana, two parallel definitions of ‘indigenous peoples’ have been used; 
one refers to all of the African people in Botswana, including the Tswana major-
ity population and other minorities; the other definition refers to the non-dominant 
group of original inhabitants, the San, and regards other non-Tswana groups as 
minorities, but not as indigenous. The disagreements over the CKGR relocation 
program exemplify the conflictual relationship between the two understandings of 
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indigeneity (Maruyama, 2009). Whereas the government argued that all of the 
people in Botswana are equal and indigenous and that the San should be inte-
grated into mainstream society, the NGO negotiation team claimed that the San 
should be granted the rights of an ‘indigenous people’ and be allowed to continue 
their traditional way of life on their ancestral lands.
From the perspective of the Botswanan government, the CKGR relocation was 
aimed towards improving the lives of the San, whom they saw as an impover-
ished, weak, and needy minority that ought to be integrated into the Botswana 
nation through the RADP. The process of nation-building and of creating national 
unity after independence has been one of the key challenges for the Botswanan 
government as well as for many post-colonial African states. Furthermore, as a 
‘frontline state’ in the fight against apartheid South Africa, the Botswanan govern-
ment consciously adopted a ‘non-racial democracy’ and denied separate develop-
ment based on differential treatment along racial or ethnic lines (Government of 
Botswana, n.d.). Therefore, an important part of Botswana’s nation-building strat-
egy has been the identification of all citizens as ethnic Tswana (Hays, 2004). 
However, this ‘one-nation consensus’ (Werbner, 2004: 38) tends to result in the 
non-recognition of ethnic minorities, and sometimes leads to their assimilation into 
the Tswana majority. 
Conversely, the NGOs use the term ‘indigenous’ to highlight the cultural dis-
tinctiveness of the San, who came to serve as an example of the genuine and 
unique culture of hunter-gatherers, which they considered in danger of disappear-
ing. Moreover, they emphasized the San’s experience of repression and marginal-
ization by both the majority population and the Botswanan government. It is also 
important to consider the deliberations of the 2006 African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), which resulted in a definition of indigenous peo-
ples that underscored a group’s self-identification, its special attachment to and 
use of traditional lands, as well as its historical or contemporary experiences of 
marginalization, exclusion, or discrimination as a result of cultural differences in 
lifestyle and/or modes of production (ACHPR, 2006). Based on these criteria, the 
NGO negotiation team treated the San as an indigenous people, and applied the 
legal and political strategies that had been established among indigenous peoples 
in the Americas and the Pacific to their case. 
Although the approach of the negotiation team was endorsed internationally, the 
government stance primarily gained domestic support. As the CKGR issue became 
a popular national and international issue, the debate became increasingly simpli-
fied, confronting the San with a binary choice: development or tradition. More-
over, public attention concentrated primarily on the debate itself and the projected 
imaginings of the government and the NGOs, whereas the reality of the relocated 
San was left behind. Yet, to understand the impact of the indigenous rights move-
ment and of the 2006 ruling on San society, it is important to examine their actual 
daily lives and the coping strategies developed in response to the relocation, which 
is the topic of the following section.
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Daily Life of the Relocated San 
Maruyama’s field research, conducted between 2000 and 2006, suggests that the 
San adopted coping strategies that differed from those predicted by both the gov-
ernment and NGOs. The resettlement and development program had drastically 
changed the living environment of the |Gui and ||Gana. The Kx’oensakene reset-
tlement site contained facilities typically found in government RAD settlements in 
Botswana, including a hospital, elementary school, and village office. The residents 
were given either 15 goats or 5 cattle. Moreover, the government employed some 
residents as construction workers and initiated income-generating projects. 
Pensions for elderly individuals and food aid were also provided. 
Although some residents accepted the changes, others moved from the resettle-
ment site to the surrounding bush, forming small residential groups within a 20 
km radius. Those who remained in the resettlement site lived by wage labor and 
occupied residential plots planned by the government. In contrast, those who left 
primarily engaged in hunting and gathering, and lived in small residential groups 
consisting of several families. Although two distinct types of habitation emerged 
after the relocation, a reciprocal flow of people was maintained for economic and 
social reasons. Most individuals moved back and forth between the resettlement 
site and bush dwellings in response to changing employment opportunities, sea-
sonal shifts in the availability of wild vegetables, or difficulties with neighbors. 
Daily visits, often involving exchanges of goods and services, occurred between 
those inside and outside the resettlement site. Residents of both resettlement and 
bush dwellings attempted to utilize the government services provided by the devel-
opment program, as well as the natural resources found in the bush (Mauryama, 
2003). 
Furthermore, the economic gap between wealthy and poor San individuals became 
more visible during subsequent years. For example, most of the earliest bush 
dwellers built simple huts, and their lives were based on hunting and gathering 
and small-scale farming and herding. However, a few bush dwellers attempted to 
keep more livestock, and to cultivate larger agricultural fields than required for 
consumption with the aim of converting the surplus into cash. They also owned 
vehicles or donkey carts for use in hunting and gathering and for traveling to and 
from the resettlement. As Maruyama’s research regarding the presence or absence 
of cars or donkey carts, cattle, goats, and fields illustrates, economic disparities 
widened in 2006 compared with the situation in 2000.
The features of the daily life of the San after the relocation can be summarized 
as follows. First, they sought to reorganize their traditional way of life by com-
bining hunting and gathering with the new lifestyle introduced by the resettlement 
and development program (Maruyama, 2003; 2009). Second, economic disparities 
among the San living in Kx’oensakene widened (Maruyama, 2010). The next sec-
tion addresses the impact of the 2006 court ruling, which entitled some San to 
return to the CKGR, on the |Gui and ||Gana San society.
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Aftermath of the 2006 Court Ruling
The 2006 ruling was not a simple victory for the relocated San. From their 
perspective, one of the most serious problems was that the ruling did not obligate 
the government to provide social services for people living inside the CKGR 
(Judgment of the High Court of Botswana, 2006). That is, the CKGR was rede-
fined as a place where the San engage in their ‘genuine traditional way of life’ 
without government interference or support. Consequently, the members of this 
community faced a difficult choice. Individuals who wanted or needed to live 
within a developed setting, had to remain in the resettlement site, and those who 
preferred to live in their homeland had to relinquish access to development and 
social services. The other problem with the government’s ruling was that it only 
entitled the 189 people who filed the lawsuit, and their children, to return to the 
CKGR. This part of the ruling created a significant divide within the Kx’oensakene 
San community.
A research conducted by Maruyama from 2008 to 2013 revealed that about 
200–300 of the 1,500 Kx’oensakene residents returned to the CKGR. Most of 
these individuals were from the eastern part of the reserve, had ties with interna-
tional NGOs, and were named in the lawsuit. Moreover, only wealthy individuals 
were able to return, as they had to arrange for their own transportation, water, 
and other necessities to live in the reserve. Thus, the majority of people did not 
consider returning to the CKGR, but reluctantly remained in the Kx’oenshakene 
resettlement site. Some were afraid to go to the CKGR because they were not 
among the 189 applicants entitled to return, whereas others could not make a liv-
ing in the reserve without government services. It was clear that the court ruling 
posed a difficult choice between development or tradition, and that the new wealth 
disparities shaped the outcome of this choice.
After the adoption of the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
the San case again attracted the attention of the ILO and UN bodies. As a result 
of the government’s refusal to provide a constant water supply to the San in the 
CKGR, their situation deteriorated rapidly. This issue was taken up by James 
Anaya, the Special Rapporteur on the situation of the human rights and funda-
mental freedoms of indigenous peoples, who urged the government to at least 
provide basic social services, such as a water supply, in his report about Botswana 
(Anaya, 2010). Subsequently, with the support of Survival International, the water-
rights issue in the CKGR was taken to the High Court of Botswana and was 
decided in the San’s favor (Zips-Mairitsch, 2013: 365–376). However, their legal 
entitlement to water did not resolve the problem of practical access, as the water 
from the drilled boreholes was not drinkable (Morula, 2011). 
Compared with the vibrant advocacy before the 2006 court case, NGOs activi-
ties have since slowed, and the local NGO, the FPK, has disintegrated. Moreover, 
rather than engaging in legal fights and connecting with the wider international 
indigenous rights movement, most San are now concentrating on coping strategies 
at the grassroots level (Maruyama, 2012). Importantly, many San are struggling 
to convert both the CKGR and the resettlement site into livable and multifaceted 
spaces. The returnees have not severed ties with the RADP, and have attempted 
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to bring equipment, food, and water from the resettlement site to the CKGR. On 
the other hand, an increasing number of people remaining at the Kx’oensakene 
decided to create new dwellings in the surrounding bush after the court judgment 
was delivered. For those disappointed with the court judgment, the bush dwell-
ings became an important alternative, and complemented their residences in the 
resettlement site. There is frequent movement and exchange as well as mutual 
support among those who live in the CKGR, those who live in the resettlement 
site, and those who live in the bush dwellings.
The San in the CKGR and those in the resettlement site have attempted to 
maintain their mobility, and to strengthen exchange relationships and family ties. 
Many San who were not formally allowed to return have gradually started to visit 
their relatives in the CKGR on ‘short visits’ and vice versa. On such occasions, 
CKGR residents provide wild meat and leather, whereas Kx’oensakene residents 
share pension money or food aid from the government with their visitors. Many 
poorer San have asked to live with wealthier relatives to share and enable them 
to return to the CKGR. This is another way of facilitating physical and social 
mobility between the resettlement site and the CKGR, as well as between the rich 
and poor. Moreover, this mobility has gradually changed the characteristics of each 
space, and has contributed to easing the tensions within the community between 
those who could return and those who could not. 
CASE 2: THE MBORORO OF CAMEROON: FROM ‘LATE-COMERS’ TO AN 
‘INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’
This sections deals with West Africa and the political trajectories of Mbororo 
cattle pastoralists in Cameroon. The Mbororo belong to the Fulbe ethnic group, 
whose members are dispersed throughout the Sahel and Savannah belt from West 
to East Africa. The term Mbororo refers specifically to (agro-)pastoral Fulbe. 
Groups who identify themselves as Mbororo are found primarily in Niger, 
Nigeria, and Cameroon (Bocquené, 2002; Burnham, 1996; Dupire, 1970). 
Mbororo individuals can be found in many parts of Cameroon, but they pri-
marily congregate in regions favorable for cattle grazing. Although a minority in 
most regions, they have been particularly influential and politically active in 
Cameroon’s northwest, where they number approximately 130,000 individuals or 
5–10% of the total population (Tchoumba, 2006: 20). The northwest is also the 
region from which most Mbororo activists originated, and where one of the author’s 
fieldwork was conducted. The majority of the region’s inhabitants are Grassfield-
ers, who belong to linguistically distinct communities but share common features 
of economic and sociopolitical organization. While the settlement history of most 
Grassfields societies dates back several centuries, the Mbororo entered the area in 
the 1910s. Originating from the Kano region in present-day Nigeria, they slowly 
migrated southward during the nineteenth century in search of favorable ecologi-
cal and political conditions (Boutrais, 1995/96: 15–210; Dognin, 1981; Pelican, in 
press). Attracted by the fertile pastures of the Bamenda Highlands, many families 
settled there and gradually adopted a more sedentary lifestyle. 
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In the first half of the 20th century, the population density was still low, and 
the Mbororo were welcomed both by local Grassfields chiefs and the British colo-
nial administration. The Grassfielders treated them as guests on their land and 
subjects of their rulers. The British colonial administration, applying the policy of 
indirect rule, endorsed this system of accommodation and classified the Mbororo 
as ‘strangers’ who were subordinate to ‘native’ Grassfields authorities. Subsequently, 
under the regime of Cameroon’s first President, Ahmadou Ahidjo, the Mbororo 
qualified as Cameroonian citizens (Njeuma & Awasom, 1990). However, due to 
their Muslim identity and Fulbe ethnicity, they were subsumed under the cultural 
category of ‘northerners’. Consequently, the Mbororo who were born and grew up 
in northwest Cameroon were considered ‘strangers’ to the area with limited rights 
to the region’s natural and state resources. 
This situation changed in the 1990s, with Cameroon’s economic and political 
liberalization, which presented the possibility of claiming regional membership and 
facilitated vital changes in Mbororo self-understanding and political strategies.
The Rise of Ethnic Elite Associations
With Cameroon’s democratization in the 1990s, a new era, characterized by 
party politics as well as ethnic and minority politics (Nyamnjoh & Rowlands, 
1998; Takougang & Krieger, 1998), dawned. Encouraged by newly gained free-
doms and government policies, many groups began to establish ethnic or regional 
associations that acted as their representatives to the state. This novel political 
approach was also explored by young, mostly educated Mbororo, who founded 
the Mbororo Social and Cultural Development Association (MBOSCUDA) in 1992 
(Davis, 1995; Hickey, 2007; Pelican, 2008). Whereas other organizations promot-
ing Mbororo and pastoralist interests were created, MBOSCUDA soon emerged 
as the most vocal and effective organ of Mbororo self-representation to the Cam-
eroonian government, and to international development organizations. It designed 
a number of regional programs aimed at the revitalization of Mbororo cultural 
practices, the improvement of Mbororo women’s socioeconomic situation, the pro-
motion of Mbororo children’s education, and the improvement of pastoral condi-
tions (Duni et al., 2009). Several of these programs have been implemented with 
the support of local communities as well as national and international NGOs. 
Moreover, as a result of the continuous lobbying by MBOSCUDA, the Mbororo 
eventually attained the status of a regional and national minority with claims and 
rights to natural resources and political representation in their home area. These 
developments also led to a change in the self-awareness and understanding of the 
Mbororo people. Although initially associated with backwardness and superficial 
Islamization, the ethnonym Mbororo gained new, positive meanings. As Mbororo 
informants explained, they no longer saw themselves as marginalized pastoralists, 
but as an empowered Cameroonian minority. Based on these achievements, MBOS-
CUDA consolidated its credibility vis-à-vis both its Mbororo constituency and the 
Cameroonian government.
In the subsequent decade, MBOSCUDA expanded its political lobbying to the 
international arena by establishing links with the global human and indigenous 
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rights movements. Thanks to personal connections with European researchers and 
development workers, contacts were made with the International Work Group for 
Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA). In 2005, MBOSCUDA was granted special consul-
tative status by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. This 
eventually resulted in the international recognition of the Mbororo as an indige-
nous people of Cameroon. Whereas this step was reasonable given MBOSCUDA’s 
political engagement, the Mbororo’s claim to indigeneity is ambiguous from a 
critical anthropological viewpoint, as it is inconsistent with local conceptions of 
autochthony (Pelican, 2009). 
The Complexities of Indigeneity and Autochthony in Cameroon 
In Cameroon, as in other parts of western Africa, notions of indigeneity, autoch-
thony, first-comers, and natives have a long history, and frame local conceptions 
of political hierarchy and legal entitlement (Bayart et al., 2001; Lentz, 2006; 
Geschiere, 2009). In northwest Cameroon, local Grassfields societies consider them-
selves natives and guardians of the land, and regard the Mbororo as strangers and 
late-comers with limited rights to land and resources. Although this conception is 
rooted in pre-colonial notions of political power based on priority in time, it has 
also been informed by colonial and post-colonial policies. On the national level, 
discourses of autochthony were highlighted in the context of Cameroon’s democ-
ratization. As stipulated in the country’s revised constitution of 1996, priority is 
given to the protection of the rights of minorities and indigenous populations (in 
the French version peuples autochtones). According to this national political frame-
work, indigenous populations refer to local groups that consider themselves first-
comers, natives, or autochthones. This differs from the UN and ILO conception 
of indigenous peoples, which prioritizes the criteria of self-identification, historical 
or contemporary experiences of marginalization, and cultural differences from the 
majority population (Daes, 1996; ILO, 1989). As confirmed by Tchoumba in his 
ILO pilot study on Cameroon, the Mbororo as well as the so-called Pygmies (the 
Baka and Bagyeli) of southern and southeastern Cameroon fulfill the ILO and UN 
criteria, and thus may be considered indigenous peoples of Cameroon (Atelier de 
Planification, 2003; Tchoumba, 2006). Conversely, the Cameroonian government 
has never officially endorsed the two groups’ classification as indigenous peoples, 
and instead applies the notion of vulnerable or ‘marginal populations’ (in French 
populations marginales). This complex situation in which concepts have similar 
meanings but divergent applications has resulted in the puzzling situation in which 
the Mbororo internationally qualify as an indigenous people, but are viewed as 
late-comers, allochthones, or a marginalized minority in the local and national 
context. Thus, international and local interpretations of indigeneity are irreconcil-
able. 
Ambivalence and the Changing Strategies of the Indigenous Rights Movement
Despite the conceptual and terminological complexities, the recognition of the 
Mbororo as an indigenous people initiated a new era in their identity politics. 
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With the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, 
expectations that the precarious situation of minority groups would gradually 
improve were high among activists and organizations. The same hopes were shared 
by Mbororo activists, especially MBOSCUDA leaders who promoted this new, 
supra-ethnic identity to capitalize on its political strength. Yet, their subsequent 
recourse to the indigenous rights discourse produced mixed, and at times, unfore-
seen results. This section will outline two developments that seem representative 
of the learning processes of many indigenous and human rights activists in Africa 
and elsewhere: First, a process from enthusiasm to disillusionment and then to 
pragmatism, which became evident in the aftermath of the adoption of the 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; second, recent ventures into 
alternative approaches to lobbying, such as those relying on the virtual and social 
media. 
The Sabga leadership crisis of 2007 was a crucial test case for assessing the 
applicability and efficacy of the indigenous rights discourse with regard to the 
Mbororo in Cameroon (for a detailed analysis, see Pelican, 2010). The crisis 
emerged over the procedure used to select a new community leader, with Mbo-
roro activists claiming their rights as an indigenous people to political and terri-
torial integrity. The issue emerged in the summer of 2007, when government rep-
resentatives forcefully intervened in Sabga, the main Mbororo settlement in north-
west Cameroon. Through the influence of a wealthy and well-connected entrepre-
neur, the community-elected leader was administratively deposed and replaced by 
a Mbororo ruler preferred by the entrepreneur. Members of the Sabga community 
protested this interference, and the government reacted with military intervention. 
The Mbororo elite in Sabga eventually decided to use international connections to 
pressure the government. In fear for their lives, the deposed leader and his sup-
porters sought refuge at the United States embassy in the capital, Yaoundé. 
Mbororo women staged a protest at the Prime Minister’s office and demanded the 
deposition of the imposed ruler and the reinstatement of their rightful community 
leader. Moreover, with the help of MBOSCUDA, they reported the case to national 
and international human rights organizations as well as to the UN Human Rights 
Council. For a short while, the Cameroonian government seemed willing to recon-
sider the case. At the initiative of the Prime Minister, an official investigative team 
was sent to Sabga. Its members reported their findings to the President, but no 
action was taken. Mbororo human rights activists further publicized the issue and 
solicited national and international bodies to issue official letters of concern. More-
over, in 2007, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who was then the Special Rapporteur on the 
human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, visited Cameroon, 
included the Sabga leadership crisis in his report, and demanded a response from 
the Cameroonian government as well as a resolution of the issue (Stavenhagen, 
2007). Yet, although the government was obliged to deliver an opinion on the 
reported infringements of Mbororo human and indigenous rights, no actual con-
sequences followed. The deposed leader remained disempowered, and the Mbororo 
community had to come to terms with the political dynamics and internal frictions 
that had been caused by the protracted issue.
To fully understand the relevance of this case, its key features will be discussed 
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in greater detail. On one of the few occasions to garner near unanimous commu-
nity action, Mbororo women, youth, and men took to the streets in Sabga to pub-
licly protest the intervention of the regional administration in the process to select 
their future community leader. This was unprecedented in that community mem-
bers, including illiterate women and men rather than educated Mbororo activists, 
took action and traveled to the capital, Yaoundé, to seek both national and inter-
national assistance. This was the first time that MBOSCUDA’s report to the 
Special Rapporteur on the human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous 
peoples and the Human Rights Council led to an intergovernmental exchange and 
follow-up actions. However, these interventions proved inconsequential, and the 
queries of the Human Rights Council remained largely unanswered. Eventually, 
the hopes of Mbororo activists that the UN agencies and the discourse on human 
and indigenous rights would work in their favor were dashed. The ensuing reper-
cussions were twofold. They included government sanctions on Mbororo actors as 
well as disagreements within the Mbororo community regarding the efficacy of 
international interventions, and more profoundly, regarding the legitimacy of 
Mbororo claims to indigeneity. Critical voices emerged, particularly among mem-
bers of the economically progressive and political elite. In their view, classifying 
the Mbororo as an indigenous people was suggestive of Mbororo backwardness 
and poverty. Conversely, they viewed their own trajectories as evocative of Mbo-
roro advancement and their political integration on equal terms with other popu-
lation groups.
Thus, the Sabga leadership crisis initiated a phase of general disenchantment 
with global advocacy and the indigenous rights discourse. At the same time, it 
occasioned a reorientation of Mbororo activists away from public criticism of the 
Cameroonian government and its representatives and towards a more conciliatory 
approach, including collaboration with government institutions. As outlined above, 
the government integrated the indigenous rights discourse in its developmental 
agenda under the heading of ‘marginal populations’. Thus, Mbororo NGOs con-
tinue to employ and endorse this discourse, but in a less confrontational manner 
than in previous years. This is reflected in a number of recent events organized 
by Mbororo organizations that have been aimed toward generating dialogue and 
cooperation among representatives of indigenous groups, relevant government insti-
tutions, academics, and NGOs. These events are also remarkable in that they illus-
trate the repeated efforts of educated and visionary Mbororo actors to engender a 
self-understanding that transcends the narrow boundaries of Mbororo ethnicity and 
embraces the broader categories of indigenous peoples or minorities. 
New Approaches to Mbororo Advocacy and Development  
In recent years, the number of Mbororo individuals who have left the country-
side to study or work in urban centers has increased considerably. This has been 
accompanied by a proliferation of Mbororo community organizations, some initi-
ated by university students and others by professionals, in Cameroon’s urban cen-
ters. Whereas the majority of these NGOs focus on community development, some 
participate in the indigenous rights movement and are also active at the interna-
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tional level. Lelewal, a self-proclaimed indigenous peoples non-governmental orga-
nization whose founder regularly participates in UN meetings, was among the lat-
ter (Lelewal Foundation, 2012). Its founder regularly participated in UN meetings 
and together with MBOSCUDA representatives gave weight to Mbororo com-
plaints. (1) Another is the Laimaru Network, which was created in 2011 with the 
aim of supporting minority and indigenous organizations in Cameroon by provid-
ing information on fundraising, capacity building, advocacy, and social entrepre-
neurship (Laimaru Network n.d.). As this proliferation of NGOs illustrates, inter-
est and expertise in community development and advocacy have been growing 
among the Mbororo in Cameroon, particularly among educated young people. This 
has also been reflected in their recent employment of virtual and social media as 
approaches to political lobbying. The next section discusses the Justice and 
Dignity Campaign, an advocacy initiative launched in 2011 by Mbororo individu-
als based inside and outside of Cameroon.  
The initial spark for this campaign was a broadcast on a private television sta-
tion that slandered the joint development programs of the Mbororo and so-called 
Pygmies, each of which enjoys the status of an indigenous people of Cameroon. 
Taking offense at the broadcast’s racist undertones and drawing inspiration from 
the growing popularity of the social media, a small group of Mbororo activists 
decided to launch an Internet campaign using an online petition; this was followed 
by a Facebook page, a corresponding website, a YouTube channel, and a Twitter 
account. Unlike previous strategies for political lobbying and advocacy, which 
focused on the malfeasance of the Cameroonian state, this campaign highlighted 
the misdeeds of a particular individual who also played a crucial role in the Sabga 
leadership crisis. To the surprise of its initiators, the Justice and Dignity 
Campaign, especially its Facebook page, attracted considerable attention among 
Cameroonians both abroad and at home. Despite the rather rudimentary Internet 
services available, Mbororo youths, particularly in urban areas, are fully conver-
sant with Facebook and also update their non-literate and rural relatives. The cam-
paign’s supporters viewed this response as an achievement when they learned that 
their opponent was astounded by his inability to control the online flow of infor-
mation and, for the first time in a long history of Mbororo grievances, he pub-
licly responded to their accusations. The campaign’s focus has subsequently broad-
ened and now addresses various issues related to human and indigenous rights 
violations, including the mass abduction of Nigerian schoolchildren by Boko Haram 
(in April 2014), the abuse of Baka hunters by wildlife officers (in October 2014), 
and the forcible appropriation of land inhabited by Mbororo herders by the 
Catholic Church in northwest Cameroon. The latter was eventually resolved in 
summer 2014 with the official retraction of the Catholic Church in response to 
media pressure and a legal follow-up. 
As the Justice and Dignity Campaign illustrates, venturing into the virtual and 
social media has proven effective, as it has helped to publicize critical informa-
tion and develop new perspectives. At the same time, the campaign’s initiators 
have been well aware that online advocacy cannot replace more conventional forms 
of political lobbying, but may nonetheless increase their credibility and legitimacy. 
In this sense, Mbororo individuals continue to lobby on international, national, 
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and local levels. They participate in the annual meetings of the United Nations 
Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (UNPFII), submit reports to the Human 
Rights Council, and collaborate with government representatives on joint programs. 
They simultaneously run social media campaigns denouncing individual and insti-
tutional instances of malfeasance. Although the Cameroonian government has not 
fully subscribed to the concept of indigenous peoples or its legal implementation, 
the indigenous rights discourse has maintained its place in national and interna-
tional political domains.
COMPARISON AND DISCUSSION
We will compare and discuss our two cases to explore the different trajectories 
of the indigenous rights movement in Africa. Although both cases are character-
ized by considerable variation and are open to interpretation, we will reduce the 
complexity and highlight certain trends for the purpose of comparison. Moreover, 
whereas our comparison draws on specific cases (i.e., the San of the Central Kala-
hari, the Mbororo of northwest Cameroon), we believe our insights are generally 
applicable to the indigenous rights movement in Africa. We will structure our dis-
cussion around three themes: the dynamics of the indigenous rights movement, 
the role of national governments in defining and implementing indigenous rights, 
and local strategies for dealing with daily life and the outcomes of indigenous 
rights advocacy.  
The Dynamics of the Indigenous Rights Movement
We will treat 1993, the International Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, 
as the official initiation of the global indigenous rights movement in Africa. The 
Mbororo and San joined this movement at different points in time. By the late 
1980s, the San had been introduced to the concept of indigenous peoples by inter-
national NGOs; during the Year of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, they formed 
their first local organization to lobby against the relocation of the San of the 
Central Kalahari. However, the initiative as well as most of the financial and tech-
nical support for San activism came from outside the community; namely, from 
international NGOs. Thus, more than any other minority group in Botswana, the 
San of Central Kalahari have been represented by outsiders (see also Solway, 
2011). Moreover such external imaginings, concepts, strategies, and funds have 
often obscured the reality of San life. Although a few |Gui and ||Gana San have 
participated in the negotiation processes as NGO members or even leaders, most 
have not been involved. 
The Mbororo formed their first NGO around the same time, in 1992, in response 
to Cameroon’s democratization and the government’s promotion of ethnic and 
regional elite associations. At that time, a small but decisive group of educated 
Mbororo youths were the driving force behind Mbororo political activism and 
development efforts. Although they initially collaborated with national and inter-
national NGOs and were able to secure international funding for their community 
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development projects, it was only in 2005 that they joined the global indigenous 
rights movement. Thus, compared with the San of the Central Kalahari, the 
Mbororo were relative late-comers. Moreover, their participation in the indigenous 
rights movement was more self-driven and reliant on educated individuals who 
were already experienced in ethnic-based political activism. 
For both Mbororo and San, the years shortly before and after the adoption of 
the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007 were a decisive 
period that engendered much hope and high aspirations. The ILO and UN recog-
nition of the Mbororo of Cameroon as an indigenous people in 2005 increased 
their national and international visibility and opened new opportunities for 
Mbororo activists to participate in international travel and training and to access 
social and economic resources (Pelican, 2011). It should be noted, however, that 
these opportunities have primarily been used by educated Mbororo based in the 
country’s capital and the northwest region, whereas the Mbororo in other parts of 
the country have been less active in the indigenous rights movement. 
For the |Gui and ||Gana San of the Central Kalahari, the court ruling of 2006 
was a groundbreaking achievement, which could not have been achieved without 
international support and connection with the global indigenous rights movement. 
Although some of the San communities had previously been relocated by the 
Botswana government, it was not until the CKGR case that this had attracted so 
much public attention, culminating in the San plaintiffs’ entitlement to return to 
their ancestral lands. Additionally, although the |Gui and ||Gana only constitute a 
small fraction of the 10,000 San dispersed across southern Africa, their success 
in court was viewed as a historical achievement for all the San and their joint 
political movement. 
Thus, for the San and Mbororo, as well as for many other ethnic minorities in 
post-colonial Africa, the indigenous rights movement has provided a platform from 
which they could express their grievances against both the post-colonial govern-
ments and the majority populations who had colonized and marginalized them. 
Moreover, in the course of their participation in this movement, members of the 
younger generations learned to articulate their claims and achieve public recogni-
tion. This is a new situation, which differs from that in the late 1980s, the early 
stage of the indigenous rights movement in Africa.
Although the adoption of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
was hailed as an outstanding achievement that, in addition to political and cultural 
recognition, promised access to development and resources, its implementation has 
engendered new challenges. As the subsequent years have shown, recognition of 
the indigenous rights of San and Mbororo is no longer a matter of international 
deliberation. Instead, this issue rests with the Botswanan and Cameroonian gov-
ernments, which have pursued different approaches to the concept of indigenous 
peoples. 
The Role of National Governments in Defining and Implementing Indigenous Rights
As outlined above, African governments’ unease with the concept of indigenous 
peoples is based on the fact that in most parts of Africa, unlike in the Americas 
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or the Pacific, the distinction between indigenous and non-indigenous or settler 
populations has been problematic. Yet, even after resolving the issue by modify-
ing the text of the declaration, many African governments have retained their 
skepticism vis-à-vis the concept of indigenous peoples. Furthermore, African coun-
tries differ considerably regarding their approaches to nation-building and how to 
deal with ethnic pluralism. This is illustrated by the comparison between the cases 
of Botswana and Cameroon.  
The post-colonial government in Botswana has always adopted the ideology of 
a ‘one-nation-consensus’ in distinction to South Africa’s former ethnic-based 
segregation or apartheid system. The concept of RADs was introduced to provide 
social services and access to development to the country’s most marginalized pop-
ulations and to assist them in integrating into the Botswanan nation. Concurrently, 
the government has been strongly opposed to the idea of the differential treatment 
of its citizens on any basis other than economic disparity. Accordingly, the Botswa-
nan government still refuses to formally apply the UN concept of indigenous peo-
ples to its citizenry, arguing that all Batswana (i.e., citizens of Botswana) are 
indigenous. This position was tested in the 2006 court ruling, but the Botswanan 
government never officially recognized the San as indigenous peoples. Moreover, 
its citizens’ entitlement to social and development services is based on the crite-
rion of living in so-called RAD settlements, and Kx’oensakene is the closest of 
these settlements to the CKGR. Hence, the |Gui and ||Gana San were forced to 
choose to identify either as indigenous peoples or as RADs and to either return 
to their ancestral lands or have access to development. Similarly, the 2011 judg-
ment confirmed their legal entitlement not only to land but also to water. The 
Botswanan government endorsed the ruling, but argued that it was the returnees’ 
responsibility to manage their access to water.
The complexities engendered by the indigenous rights discourse have been dif-
ferent, but equally challenging, in the Cameroonian case. During the early post-
colonial period, the government promoted an ideology of nation-building and of 
unifying Cameroon’s diverse population groups, but it changed its stance with the 
country’s democratization in the 1990s, when it adopted a multiculturalism approach. 
As outlined earlier, in the context of these transformations, the government inte-
grated the concept of indigenous peoples into its policies, but soon came to real-
ize its incompatibility with pre-existing notions, such as ‘autochthones’, ‘natives’, 
and ‘first-comers’, which have similar meanings but divergent applications. As a 
result, the Cameroonian government has been inconsistent and ambiguous in its 
participation in the indigenous rights discourse, particularly with regard to the 
question of entitlement to land and natural resources (Pelican, 2013). This has also 
been the case with respect to the Sabga leadership crisis, when the state party 
effectively played for time and never took a decisive stance, even in response to 
UN pressure.  
In both our cases, UN bodies, such as the Special Rapporteur on the rights of 
indigenous peoples, increased their pressure on national governments after the 
adoption of the Declaration. In the meantime, however, the locus of negotiations 
has shifted from the international to the national level, thus underscoring the rel-
evance of the nation-state. Eventually, both the |Gui and ||Gana San of the 
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Central Kalahari and the Mbororo of Cameroon were disappointed with their gov-
ernments’ varying stances and the outcomes of their lobbying strategies. Conse-
quently, they turned to alternative and complementary ways of trying to improve 
their situation. 
Focusing on Daily Life and Local Coping Strategies
In both case studies, we focused on the coping strategies employed by the San 
and Mbororo in response to the unforeseen results of their engagement in the 
indigenous rights movement. Although each study highlights different types of 
reaction, we found that both groups have recently been maintaining a distance 
from the global indigenous rights movement and have tried to develop alternative 
and complementary strategies.
As outlined above, the |Gui and ||Gana San of the Central Kalahari have devel-
oped new forms of dwelling, mobility, and sociability, which help them to miti-
gate the social and economic inequalities that have resulted from the 2006 court 
ruling. According to the San ignored by this judgment, the CKGR was their com-
mon land, and there was no comprehensible reason that only 189 people were 
allowed to return while others had to stay behind. They also criticized the fact 
that the responsibility for adjusting to Botswanan society and culture has always 
been placed on them and that the Botswanan government has never attempted to 
integrate or adapt to San ways of thinking and acting. Thus, according to a San 
community leader, it is not the San who are remote area dwellers (RADs), but 
the Gaborone government that is ‘remote’ from the San community (Mogwe, 1992). 
In the same way, San interlocutors resented being reduced to the image of tradi-
tional hunter-gatherers who can (and should) do without access to development, 
as proposed by several NGOs. In this sense, it is their frustration that the San 
identity and lifestyle is defined by ‘others’, be it as RADs or traditional hunter-
gatherers, which has motivated them to move their focus from politics to daily 
life and local coping strategies.  
In the Mbororo case, there has been a proliferation of NGOs and global rights 
discourses, including regarding indigenous, human, and minority rights, during the 
past few years. The most recent trend, however, is the use of social media as a 
new strategy for addressing the interference of individual and corporate actors in 
Mbororo land rights and community politics. Rather than asking the international 
community to hold national governments accountable for violations of indigenous 
rights, they have used the Internet and social media as a more direct way to 
engender public outrage. The latters’ effectiveness, however, depends on the num-
ber of people who have access to and support the virtual media campaigns. As 
in most parts of Cameroon, Internet literacy has increased considerably during the 
past few years. Indeed, Mbororo social media activism has, at least for the moment, 
achieved its goal, providing an uncensored platform that is accessible to all inter-
ested in Mbororo issues.  
Hence, the San and Mbororo have, in their own ways, turned to more direct 
and informal strategies of resolving or addressing their problems. At the same 
time, they continue to engage in the indigenous rights discourse where appropri-
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ate. However, they often do so in a less confrontational manner than before, aim-
ing for collaboration rather than conflict with government institutions and neigh-
boring groups. 
CONCLUSIONS
As outlined in this article, the indigenous rights movements in Botswana and 
Cameroon have followed a trajectory from expectation and success to disillusion-
ment and pragmatism. Both communities under study have experienced successes 
as well as internal disagreements and conflicts. Like many transformational pro-
cesses, the indigenous rights movement has benefited some and disadvantaged oth-
ers. This applies not only to members of the San and Mbororo communities but 
also to neighboring groups, some of whom may have felt excluded or alienated 
by the indigenous rights discourse. Moreover, the widely shared understanding of 
indigenous peoples as characterized by cultural distinctiveness and a strong attach-
ment to their ancestral lands poses the risk of ‘re-traditionalizing’ people and 
excluding minorities who, willingly or unwillingly, have relinquished much of their 
distinctive culture and who, for better or worse, have adopted a different lifestyle. 
To complement our explorations of the indigenous rights movement in Africa, 
we will briefly consider the case of the Maasai of Tanzania, as introduced in the 
beginning of this article. Maasai pastoralists began to participate in the global 
indigenous rights movement in the late 1980s, but they later turned away from 
the indigenous rights discourse to a more nationally based discourse regarding 
pastoral development (Hodgson, 2011). This shift in Maasai activism resembles 
similar changes in the Mbororo and San movements, which moved from employ-
ing the indigenous rights discourse to apply international pressure to adopting a 
more conciliatory approach and collaborating with government institutions. Unlike 
Hodgson’s interpretation of the Maasai case, which underscores strategic shifts 
from one discourse to another, we view the Mbororo and San cases as involving 
the diversification of strategies and the simultaneous adoption of various discourses. 
That is, identification as an indigenous people is not the only or necessarily the 
most effective strategy for advancing claims; yet, depending on the context, it can 
still be one effective approach among others.
Hodgson used the concept of ‘positioning’ to frame these shifts in orientation. 
She related these shifts to the need of local institutions, organizations, and indi-
viduals to respond and position themselves in relation to the changing discourses 
shaped by the international community and development establishment. In the 
1980s, the focus was on the civil society as a self-governing body; however, the 
role of national governments has been reconsidered in the 2000s. Consequently, 
government institutions have been increasingly integrated into the conception and 
implementation of development programs and, most importantly, in the allocation 
of funds. Thus, in contrast to popular assumptions that the power of nation-states 
would wane in the wake of neoliberalism and globalization, our case studies from 
different parts of the continent attest to the enduring relevance of African nation-
states for negotiating legal entitlements and accessing development.  
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Finally, after comparing the indigenous rights movements in Africa with its 
senior counterparts in the Pacific and the Americas, we believe that although claims 
to indigeneity in Africa tend to be contentious, they also occur within a context 
that offers more opportunities for flexible engagement and disengagement with the 
indigenous rights discourse. That is, the Mbororo, San, or Maasai may eventually 
stop being indigenous if they no longer refer to themselves or are referred to as 
an indigenous people. Moreover, due to the complex and longstanding histories 
of mobility, interdependence, and ethnic coexistence in most parts of Africa (see 
also Lenssen-Erz and Yatsuka in this volume), many individuals and groups tend 
to be wary of offending their neighbors, whose sympathy and understanding are 
considered relevant to their everyday lives. Thus, they carefully weigh their options, 
depending on the situation or context, which, as we have seen, can change rap-
idly, and decide whether to press claims based on an exclusivist indigenous iden-
tity or to adopt a more conciliatory approach that emphasizes coexistence and 
collaboration. Whereas similar processes may operate and similar considerations 
may be relevant in other parts of the globe, we consider this careful balancing of 
strategies of inclusion and exclusion to be a crucial aspect of the indigenous rights 
movement in Africa. 
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organization’s future remains to be seen.
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